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Abstract 
There are numerous studies that examined the choice of accounting methods by IPO 
firms as a device to manage earnings prior lo going public (Aharony el al.. 1993; 
Friedlan. 1994; Neill et al.. 1995; Black et al., 2002). This sludy extends Neill et a]. 
(1995) by examining the association bchvecr~ accounting method choice and IPO 
valuation in Malaysia. Howeva. instead of using accounting policies that are related 
to depreciation and invenlory, this shdy looks at accounting method for bllsiness 
combination namely the purchase vs. merger method. By examining 62 IPOs during 
2001 and 2002, the multivariate analysis shows that, consistenl with lhe hypotheses, 
the liberal accounting method for business combination is positively associated with 
offer price and negatively associated with fnst day closing price and underpricing. 
However. none of the coeff~icnts associated with accounting method are statistically 
significant. IPO offer price is positively influenced by forecasted earnings, net 
tangible assets and firm size. Fint day closing price is significantly influenced by 
forecaned earnings. IPO consists of exclusively new sham issue (i.e. participation 
ratio by IPO entrepreneurs equals zero) yields higher undapricing muislent with 
Habib and Ljungqnst (2001). As expected. another important determinant of IPO 
underpricing is oversubscription rate with highly ovmubscritcd 1PO generates 
grealer un&rpricing. 
1. Inirodutthn 
Initial public offering (IPO) or going public is en important milestone in a wmpaay's 
life cycle. In a typical IPO, a part of the company's shares are sold to public investom. 
Following the IPO, shares in the company are quoted on a stock exchange for the h t  
time so that investors are able to trade them. Empirical evidence aromd the world 
conclusively shows that W )  investors on average e m  positive initial e t m m  frum 
purchasing shares at the IPO offer price and selling them at the closing pice on the 
first day of d i n g .  In other words, IPOs arc generally underpncad relative to the 
subsequent market value. IPO underpricing, or positive initial return, is defmed as the 
premium earned by [PO investors on the f i t  day of trading being the difference 
between aftermarket closing price and offer price divided by offer price. 
The majority of previous work on IPO focused on explaining the IPO underpricing 
phenomenon and identifying its determinants. IPO underpricing rrpffsents a cost to 
the company going public because the company receiver less financing than it would 
have had the IPO offer price hem set close to the ahmarket  price. An underpriced 
IPO mews that mom money is "left on the table" for the IPO investors and relatively 
less is available in proceeds for the issuing company. In other words, selling shares at 
IPO for less than their hue value results in a wealth bransfer fium !PO 
companylselling shareholders to new IPO investors. Underpriced lPOs that are sold at 
a di.scount also imply higher losses to the pre-IPO shaneholders from greater 
o~ le l s t dp  dihmon. 
Thm arc numerous studies that examincd the delenuinants of IPO underpricing. The 
latest include Certo et al. (2001). Ang and Brau (2002) and Daily et al. (2003). C e m  
el al. (2001) found that board reputation and board size have significant negative 
relationship with underpricing. but not board composition and leadership. Ang and 
Brau (2002) showed that previously levmaged buyoui firms that go public again 
(therefore more transparent than first-time IPO firms) pay less, in all components of 
issuancc costs (including underpricing). lo go public. Daily et al. (2003) provided a 
ma-analysis of previous studies on IPO underpricing. Their findings showed that 
underpricing is significanlly rclatcd lo retained equity, undmiter pratige. alulitor 
reputation, fum sue. firm age, ventlrre capital equity, offer price and 1PO gross 
proceeds but not significantiy related lo number of risk factors and the uses of 
proceeds. 
Unlike tbe above studies which examined IPO underpricing per se. Wan-Hursin 
(2002) and Klein (1996) focused on Ihe determinants of offer price and fist day 
closing price of IPOs, which are the two ingredients of IPO underpricing. Wan-Hussin 
(2002) showed that forecasted earnings is an important factor in pricing the 1POs. His 
result also showed that IPO subscription ntc is a major determinant of IPO fint day 
markci valuation. Whilst Klem (19%) reported that offer price and afbmarket 
valuation are significantly related to financial variables such as earnings per share and 
book value of equity and non-financial variables such as underwriter prestige and 
n u m b  of risk factors. She also found that auditor type and firm age are not related to 
IPO pricing and a f t h c t  valuation. 
There nre also numerous stulies that examined, either directly or indireclly. Ihe choice 
of accounting methods by IPO firms as a device to nunage earnings prior lo going 
public (Aharony et al., 1993; Friedh, 1994: Neill et al., 1995; Black et al., 2002). 
With the exception of Neill et al. (1995). the other studies do not tes( the inlluence of 
accounting choices on IPO value. Neill et al. (1995) examined two accounting choices 
namely &preciation mdhod (straight lime or accelerated) and inventory method 
(LIFO a FIFO), and the assmiation between accounting method choice and IPO 
proceeds and 1PO underpricing. Thei result indicated that the selection of liberal 
accounting melhods that results in larger income and a& values is associated with 
higher initial proceeds fmm an offering. By applying the risk of litigation argument, 
their mul t  also revealed that the presence of liberal accounting metha& kads to 
higher level of underpricing. 
This study extends Neill et al. (1995) by examining the accounting method choice and 
IPO valuation in Malaysia. However, instead of using accounting policies that are 
related to depreciation and inventory. this study focuses on the accounting treatments 
for business combinatiow and the resulting purchased goodwill, if any.' Firstly. there 
are little variations in choices of accounting method. for depreciation and inventory. 
And secondly, accounting for business combination is a common policy choice faced 
by IPO f m s  as restructuring thmugh busines combinations is often part and parcel 
of the listing exercise prior to an IPO. Cut of 62 IPO h s  dining 2001 and 2002. 52 
firms (or 84 percent) have merger and acquisition as part of the listing exercise. For 
all the sample companies, thc average value of acquisihon apmssed as a percentage 
of h e d  and eunent is about 43 percent 
' R m W  g&ll ariYs A m  r hginerr aequirar amher as a p i n t  mnccrn and thc combinanon 
is mounted fa as m acquisition (as opposed to merger). Ar an example if the fair vahe of A Bhd'r 
nerrrscoir RMlO million and B Bhd paid RMl5 million roacquirr a 100 pmml equity inrcmtin A 
Bhd, tk p u r e W  goodwill ir RM5 million. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discuses the a~CnuOMg for 
business combinations in Malaysia including the differences bchveen the merger 
method (known as pooling+f-interests in the US) and acquisition method (hown as 
purchase method in the US).' Section 3 reviews the relevant literahre and develops 
the hypotheses. The sample xleaion. data source and the IPO valuation models are 
elaborated in section 4. ?he findings are discussed in section 5. Section 6 concludes. 
2. Accounting for Business Combiaatioos in Malaysia 
According to Malaysian Accounting Stardards Board (MASB) 21 thnt governs ~ h c  
amounting for business combinations in Malaysia, an acquisition is  a business 
combination that is not a merger. It arises when one of the enterprises, the aquirer, 
obtains control over the net assets and operations of another enterprise, the aquirec, 
in exchange for the transfer of wets ,  inmcnce  of a liability or issue of equity. On 
the other band, a merger is a business combination in which the shareholders of the 
combining en(erprises combine conrrol over the whole, or effectively the whole, of 
their net assets and opentiom to achieve a continuing muhlal sharing of the risks and 
benefits attaching to the combined entity such hi neither party can be identsied a< 
the acquirer. 
Based on h e  above distinction behvecn merger and acquisition, there are two 
methods available to account for business combinationr namely the merger/pooling- 
of-interests method and thc acquisitionlpurehase method 
'The m s  mrp mahad and pooling-of-interns arc uwd inmchangeably. The ~ s m c  goes fa 
rquiririon mcfhcd and pvchase mnhod. 
6 
2.1 Acquuirion /Purchase Amwrting 
According to MASB 21. \mdm the purchase method, one company is viewed as 
having a@ the net asses and business of another. The acquim records the assets 
acquired a d  liabilities assumed. based an their fan vahes at the date of acquisition. 
Any a c e s  of total acquisition cost over the fair value of identifiable ass% and 
liahilitia is assigned to goodwill, which is generally amortized to expense in future 
periods. 
In Malaysia, purchased goodwill is one of the mart controvetsial areas of financial 
accounting and reponing in recent years. According to Tan (1992), there are three 
methods that are commonly uqed to account for goodwill; capilaliration as a 
permanent item, capitalization and a m o b t i o n  and immediate write-off to reserve. 
He revealed that out of 155 companies that reported positive goodwill, 34% 
capitalized goodulill as a permanent item, 36% capitalucd and amortized it and 27% 
wrote it off immediately against reserves. 
Subject to the provisions of MASB ED 28, any excess, as at the date of the achange 
bansaction, of the acquim's interest in the fair values of the identifiable assets and 
liabilities acquired over the cost of the acqu~sition, should be recognized as negative 
goodwill. To !he extent lhat negative goodwill relates to expectations of h u e  lasses 
and expenses that are identified in the acquim's plan for the acquisition and can be 
measurcd reliably, but which do not represent identifiable liabilities at the date of 
acquisition, that portion of negative goodwill should be recognized as income in the 
income statement when the future losses and expenses are recognizd 
But, to the extent that negative goodwiIl does not relate to identifmble cxpected fume 
losses and expenses that can be measured reliably at the date of acquisition, negative 
goodwill should be recognized as income in the income statement as follows; (i) the 
amount of negative goodwill not exmeding the fair values of acquired identifiable non 
monetary assets should be recognized as income on a systematic basis ovn the 
remaining weighted average useful life of the idmtifmble acquired depreciable/ 
amortizable asseis; and (ii) the a m m t  of negative goodwill in m e w  of the fair 
values of acquired identifiable non monetary assets should be recognized as income 
immediately. 
To the extent that negative goodwill docs not relate to expectation of fumc losscs dnd 
expenses that have been identified in the acquirer's plan for the acquisition and can be 
measured reliably, negative goodwill represent a bargain purchase i.e. the assets have 
been purchased for less than the awegate of their individual fair values. Negative 
goodwill is thus a gain, which is recognized as ilrome when the fume economic 
benefits embodied in the identifiable &prcciable/amortizable assets acquired are 
consumed. In the rare case that the amount of negative goodwill exceed the fair value 
of the non monetary assets, the excess pertains to bargain purchase of monetary 
assets. Unda the laner circumstances. the excess is a gain that is recognuad 
immediately. 
2.2 Merger Accounting 
The merger or pooling-of-interests business combination is accounted for as a 
combining of stockboldm inlerests and the historical values of assets, liabilities and 
s~~kholders '  equities of the pooling companies arc combined as of the date of the 
business combinaticm. Became assets are not adjuskd to fair value, the histdeal ass* 
values carried f m a r d  usually result in lower future depreciation expenses than would 
have resulted from the purchase method. Also, goodwill is not established, and 
therefore there is no future goodwill amortization in a pooling-of-interesb ?he 
diffmnce, if any, between the coat of the merger and the nominal value of the shares 
receivcd in exchange should te shown as a movement in other capital reserves in thc 
combined enterprise's financial statements. 
Prior income ShlmYentS are reslated to combine the operations of the pooled 
companies as if the combination had always teen in effect Due m lower depreciation 
and amortization expenses. them is an incentive for companies to use the merger 
method as it resulted in higher r e p i e d  earnings (income increasing) in future ptiods 
and higher reporred returns on equity as a result of lower equity in the balance sheet 
To summarize, according to Vincent (1997), the main differences between merger 
method and acquisition methnd are as follows. Under the acquhition method the 
income statmnent for the combined enlcrprise incorporates the accountr of h e  !arget 
only from the datc of the combination and includa increased depreciation on the 
excess of fair d e l  value over book value of targel's net assets as well m 
a m o b t i o n  of any acquisition goodwill h m  that dale f m a r d .  Under merger 
method, the asset and liability aocormts of the bidder and target are combined at book 
value as though the lwu fums had always teen a single cn-se. Because merger 
method includes the target's income from the beginning of the year and does not 
recognize increased depreciation and amortization charges, net inmme in the year of 
the acquisitim is generaUy greater under merger method than it is under acquisition 
method (assuming thc target reports net incmc and not a net loss). In years 
subscqucnt to the acquisition, fmancial statement differences duc lo the amortization 
of the goodwill and thc inclrased depreciation of net assets with market values in 
excess of book values result in lower reported net income and w a t e r  reported net 
assets under acquisition accounting than uuder merger accounting 
Given the differerltial crrects on income stakmenls and balance sheet that emanatc 
tiom the choiee in accounting methods for business combinations. this study 
examines whether the pwchase-pooling choice has any impacts on IPO pricing, IPO 
first day valuation and consequently IPO underpricing. 
3. Litermtnre Review and Bypotbeses Development 
One of the earliest studies on the purchase versus pooling choice was done by Gagnon 
in 1967. Gagnon was conecmed with predicting whether a business combination 
would be accounted for as a purchase or as a pooling-of-interests. Given that post- 
acquisition inwme might differ based on the selected method, Gagnon argwd that 
management might wish to account for thc acquisition in a manner which besl 
accomplished its goals. He stressed on two important hypotheses about accounting 
policy; they arc the traditional hypothesis, where an accounlants have traditionally 
believed that h s  maximized lhcir reported incomc and the income smoothing 
hypothesis, where the managers are interested in smoothing rather than maximizing 
reported inwme (Hepwo* 1953). His lrsult indicated that when the price paid for 
(he acquired f m  exceeds book value of thc acquired f m ,  there k a greata 
likelihood that firms chose pooling-of-interesls method. 
Howevcr, his study was criticized on the ground of timeliness of his dam. Sapimza 
(1967) noted that during the sample period 1955-58 of Gagnon's study, the pooling- 
of-interests m&od was little understood. In addition, Wyau (1967J gave &ee 
that a substantial erosion in the pmling guidelines had encouraged a steady trend to 
ucc pooling method of businas embination. Another limitation in Gagnon's study is 
the assumption that if goodwiU arising in a purchase combination is not amortized, so 
it will be reclassified as a pooling. This may be misspecified since the pooling metW 
has many attributes other than mm-recognition of goodwilL First, only a portion of 
any differcnee between fair values and asset book values may be attributable to 
goodwill. Thus. not-amortization of the goodwill under purchase method would not 
neassarily get the same effect on the post-combmation income statement as would 
the uu of pooling method. 
Addressing the limitations in Gagnm's study, Copcland and Wojdak (1969) 
examined business combinations during 1966-67 period. Thy found a significsnt 
shift toward the pooling+f-interests method for business combination since 1958. 
Thy also found stronger support far the hypothesis thm firms chose business 
combination method that maximizes repaned income. 
Continuing with the research theme on management's choice of acenunling treahnent 
for business combinations, Dunne (19W) provided evidence that economics and 
political considerations play a significant role in accounting c h o w .  She tested four 
firm-specific characteristics associated with the choice of pooling-of-int- a 
purchase accounting and found that firm ownenhip sbuctlae, accounting-based 
compensation plans, lending agreement and political visibility are related to 
accounting choice. 
Gore el al. (2000) examined managers' preference for godwill accounting methods 
in the UK. Their results indicated that debt covenant restrictions and profit-baud 
management compensation plans seem to influence company preferences, consisten1 
wilh the contracting theory advocated by Wans and Z i a n  (1 986, 1990). 
Aboody et al. (2000) lookcd at the firm's choices bchvcc~~  the purchase and pooling 
methods in stock-for-stock acquisition. They found that in acquisitions with large 
difference between the acquisition price and the book value of the squired firm's net 
assets (referred to as siepup), CEOs wlth eamings-based compensation arc more 
likely to ehoose pooling and avoid the earnings 'pmalty' associated wilh purchases. 
They also showed that there is no association behveen stock-based compensation and 
Lhe purchase-pooling ehoice, suggesting that managers are not concerned about 
implications of large slepups for their market-based compensation lhan for their 
earnings-based compensation. In addition, they also showed h t  managers of highly 
lcvered 6 m  are more inclined to use the purchase method to account for large steg 
up acqmitions. consistent with ils favorable balance sheet effcca. 
Based on the a b 0 ~  studies, it appears that management's choice for a particular 
method to account for business combination or accounting goodwill is driven by 
various motives, among others. to increase repried income and compensation, avoid 
debt covenant reshictions and reduce political visibility. 
In addition lo the studies on the determimb of purchase-pooling choice, there arc 
also shdies that investigate whether differences in metllods of accounting for business 
combination can influence analysts' end investors' valuation judgments and decisions. 
Hong et al. (1978) examined whether the method of accounting for m a g m  affect cbe 
stock prices of the acquiring fnns. The conventional view is thal inwston believed 
that company using the pooling-of-intests method in QI aoquisition with positive 
goodwill have higher stock price because of the higha earnings (hey record when 
using this mnhod But, in mbadiction with the popular belief, the researchers found 
no abnormal price movemcnt in the pRiod surmmding the merger or the earnings 
announcements immediately the merger. Conversely, they found some evidence 
of higher stock prices in the period preceding a merger for a much smaller sample of 
companies using the pmchase method Overall the evidence supports the contention 
that the stock market is not fooled by the accounting method choice. Rather it can see 
through the window dressing effect of pooling. 
Another study thal investigated the e f f d  of equity valuation from choosing beWm 
the purcbase and pooling methods of business combinstions is Vincmt (1997). She 
wanted to know whether the total accounting dif f~mce between purchase and 
pooling method is reflected in share price and also whether the investon make m y  
a=--ng adjustments in order to value purchase and pooling firms on an equivalent 
basis. Ovaall, her result suggest4 that the conocms about the negative vabt ion  
implications of purchase acwunting are M I  unjustified Finn applying the pooling-of- 
interest method of accounting enjoy a valuation premium relatively to those applying 
purchase acwunting method ?he premium enjoycd by them is largest in the year of 
acquisition and remainc significant far two or three years following the acquisition. 
Rather tban using archival data. Hopkins et al. (2000) conducted an experiment on 
equity analysts to test whether various methods of accounting for business 
combinations affecl analysts' stock pnce judgments. The tbree accounting trcabnents 
tested are (I)  recorded and amortized purchase goodwill (the researchers labeled it as 
aocounting acquisition premium or AAP) under the purchax method. (2) immediately 
expensed the entire AAP in the year of acquisition under the purchase metbod. better 
known u writing off acquisition premium as in-process research and development 
and (3) did not m d  the AAP because it applied the pooling-of-interests method. 
The results supported the anecdotal view that nnalysts' stock-pricc judgments wcrc 
lowest when the company applied purchase accounting and amortized the AAP. 
Higher priees were estimated by the analysls when the company applied either 
pooling-of-interests accounting or purchase accounting with immediate wxite off of 
the aquisition premium as in-process research and developmcnr 
H o p h  et al. (2000) also invcstigated whether the year the business combination 
occurred gave an effects on the valuation judgments made by the financial analysts. 
The lowest price were estimated by the analysts when the company acquired its 
subsidiary three years before the current r i a l  years and using the purchase method 
with ratably amortized goodwill. However, if the business combination had oocurred 
in thc mart recent fiscal year, purchase accounting with g&ll amortization 
resulted in stock price judgments that were (I) higher than when the company used 
the same method of accounting lo a threeyeardld busines combination, (2) lower 
tban each case (i.e. one year and three years after the combination) or pooling-of- 
intcresls accounting and (3) lower than each care of purchase accounting with 
immediate wxite off of the acquisition praniurn as in-process research and 
development. In addition, regardless of timing of the business combination, analysts' 
price judgment was no statistically different when comparing the pooling-of-interests 
accamting and purchase a c m t i n g  with immediate mile off of the acquisition 
premium in-process research and development 
None of the studies mviewed abovc examined the consequences of purchase-pooling 
choice in the P O  context. This study fills such a gap. In the 1PO context. there are 
several studies that examined (I) whether firms going public manage their earnings 
through discretionary accounting choice, and (2) the comeqwence of the accounting 
choices on 1PO valuation, but none examine specifically the accounting choice for 
business combinations. Aharony ct al. (1993) investigated whether managers behave 
opportunistically by manipulating firms' camings before going public. They did not 
examine specific accounting methods but estimate earnings management using 
abnormal accruals. The evidence showed that earnings management is not pervasive 
among finnr going public and is mom pronounced for smaller firms and those with 
higher leverage, and is to a lesser degree related to the quality of underwritem and 
auditors. On the other hand, Fricdlan (1994) dacumented that issum of PO ,  on 
avenge, use discretionary accruals to increase income prior to going public. 
Unlike Aharony el al. (1993) and Friedlan (1994). Neill et al. (1995) examined 
earnings managemnt prior to IPO by directly obsnving the amounting methods that 
firms selected prior to going public. Firm are categorized under "liberal" or 
"conservative" based on the accounting policies used for depreciation and inventory. 
Conservatives are f m s  that adopted accelerated depreciation method and 
predominantly used LIFO inventoty methods that have income dccreasing effcct. 
Liberals arc firms that used neither accelerated depreciation nor UFO mventory 
method They examined the link between accounting method choice and IPO initial 
olYering proceeds and by applying litigation risk, they also examined the relationship 
between accounting method choice and the level of underpricing. Using IPO proceeds 
as the depcndcnt variahlc, their result showed W the accounting method choice 
variable indicating corrtcrvative (1) or liberal (0) is marginally significant (negative 
relationship), cmistent with their prediction that fums choosing liberals method are 
priced more highly than those choosing conrenative method. For the sccond test, they 
found that the liberal and conservative f m  are significantly different from each 
other in terms of undcrpricing. As they p r ed i ca  there is a negative relationship 
between accounting method and underpking, consistent with the view that 
undcrpricing is used as a vehicle to reduce litigation risk 
Bared on the foregoing discussion, wc expect that opportunistic managers choose 
liberal accounting method to boost the IPO offer price. However. investors are not 
fooled by the purchase-pooling manipulation and can see through the charade and 
accordingly Vmalized" companies that uu h e  liberal method with lower valuation 
on the first trading day. Consequently, the underpricing i.e. the difference between 
first day closing and offer price is exp-ctcd to be minimal for liberal companies. The 
underpricing for conservative company is expavd to be more compared to liberal 
company as the former does not engage in acccunting %anipulation" to boost 
earnings in order to set higher offer price. Thus, the hypotheses (expressed in 
alternative form) are: 
HI:  &re is a positive association between IPO ofler price and liberal 
arcowsing method 
H2: There u a ncgativc associaiion between lPO$rsr &y closing price ~d 
likrnl accounting method 
H3: %re ir a negative mociaiion between IPO underpricing and liberal 
crccounting method. 
4. Rcsearcb Methodology 
4. I Sample Selection and Data Source 
To investigate the relationship b e e n  accounting method choice and IPO valuation. 
all 64 IPO finns whiieh wen l i d  on the Main and Second Boards of KLSE in the 
years 2001 and 2002 were examined. From the population, two companies are 
excluded due to incomplete dam. The final sample contains 62 m0 fm; 20 lined in 
2001 and 42 in 2002. 
The main data source is the IPO prospectus. The prospectus is supplmented with data 
from the annual repo~ts and Investors Digest. The data collected for each m0 firm 
am closing price, offer or subscription price, auditor-cumreporting accountant, major 
milexwriter. sectoral classifications (i.c. industrial products. construetion. consumer 
prcduct, mding and smices, propnties etc). imposition of share moratorium, full I2- 
month sales for the most recent three years prior to IPO, total a w ,  number of 
primary shares issued in public issue, number of x c o n d q  shares offered for sale, 
utilization of PO proceeds, net tangible assets, forecasted earning per share. boad 
size and number of executive directon and non executive diiwrs, oversubscription 
rate and accounting methods used for business combinations. 
?'here are two accounting methods lhet IPO companies use to account for business 
combination; acquisition or merger methods. For companies that use acquisition 
method, t h m  is a varicty of t reatmnl.5 for the purchased goodwill (negative or 
positive). Positive goodwill are cither amortized o v a  5, 10, 20 or 25 years, or not 
amortired at all. For companies that amortize the goodwill, they are classified as 
using income decreasing (conservative) mcthod. While companies that choose not to 
amortize the goodwill or recognize negative goodwill immediately as i n m e  arc 
classified as adopting income increasing (liberal) method Companies that usc mergcr 
method arc also heated as liberals due to the absence of goodwill amortizition and 
lower depreciation of n d  assets acquired. Finally. IPO firms rhat use acquisitioo 
method and have reservc on consolidation or show insignificant and immaterial 
amount of goodwill or arc not involved in mergers and acquisitions immediately prior 
to 1PO are classified as using the neueal accounting method. The classification 
whemc is summarized in Table I. 
Table I: Accounliog Metbod CW~eotiom 
I Amortize goodwill over 5. 10.20 or 25 years 1 
Neutral as reserve on consolidation; 
positive goodwill is insignificant or immaterial; no 
I 
information regarding the u~e of acquisition or mngcr 
positive godwill not amortize; use merger method 
-- - -- I 
4.2 IPO Pricing and Valucuinn Modek 
Tbe models to test the effeN of accounting method on [PO valuation arc n p r d  as 
follows: 
OFFER - f [ACCMTD. I%, MA GROWTH, NONEXEC, USEPROC, 
POTYPE. LNFASSFIS). AUD, U%WTER]. (I) 
CLOSE - f [ACCMID. EPS. W A ,  C R O m ,  NONWIEC, USEPROC. 
OVERSUB. LN(TAS%TS). AUD. WUTER].  (2) 
UNDERPRlC = f [ACCMTD, NONEXEC, USEPROC. OVERSUB, IPOTYPE, 
MORAT, LN(TASSFIS), AUDWWRlTER]. (3) 
The variables are defined in Appndix I .  7he main variable of interest is the 
accounting method used for business combination where ACCMTD=2 for l i b l ,  
A C C M W T  for neutral and ACCMTDQ for conservative. We exped the ACCMTD 
coeficimt to be positive in equation ( I )  and negative for both equations (2) and (3). 
The rest of the independent variables are control vmiables as they have bem found to 
be significant in prrvious studies. Wan Hussin (2002) and Klein (1996) showed that 
the financial variables EPS and book value of equity or NTA and sales growlh 
(GROWTH) are significantly related to the offering price and matket price. 
Board chnracteristics a~ also important in signaling a high fmn value especially to 
firm's initial cnhy to the public market. The "quality" of thc management is important 
to dctmninc the firm's future &ormance potential. Ccm el al. (2001) reported that 
bead  reputation and board size have significant negative relationship with 
underpricing. but not board compmition and board leadership smrtllre. In this study, 
one aspect of board characteristics that is examined in the proporlion of non cxavtivc 
directors (NONEXEC). 
The rationale for including the use of proceeds 1s because it may reduce the 
uncertainty regarding the value of shares. Study by L m e  et al. (2003) showed that 
there = a significant negative asciation between the use of proceeds specificity 
and IPO underpncing. This relation stems from the disclosure regarding the use of 
proceeds for financing and investing activities such as &-leveraging, capital 
expenditure and research and development as opposed to other operating activities 
(eg; advertising, marketing promotion or sales). 
The OVERSUB variable is included in model (2) because Wan Hussin (2002) showed 
that the overwhelming determinant of first day closing pricc is the oversubscription 
rare. The number of times an P O  is oversubscribed reflects the demand for the IPO 
shares from prospective investors. 
Habib and Ljungqvist (2001) argue that IPO entrepreneurs care about underpncing to 
the e m t  that they stand to lose from it and that such losses are pmportio~l to the 
number of primary (new) and secondary (old) shares being sold. They also argue that 
rhe issum can affect the level of underpricing by promoting their shares. 7heir result 
sug~a t ed  that owners who sell more shares during IPO have more possibility to 
decrease 1PO underpricing ar a way to minimize the transfer of wealth to IPO 
investors and they also can affect the level of underpricing through the cost that thcy 
spent on promoting the ]PO. Wan Hussin (2002) ako use thc participation ratio by the 
IPO entrepreneurs (number of secondary sham offered in fk IPO divided by number 
of pre-IPO shares) as an ~ndcpendent variable in his shdy where he expected that 
owner's participation ratio is posihvely asciated with 1PO subscription price. His 
result showed that the selling owners price the IPO more "aggressively" and thereby 
experience lower underpncing the more they participated in thc IPO. In this study the 
owncr's participation ratio is proxied by a dummy indicator IPOTYPE. whereby IPO 
involving pllblic issue only (i.e. no sales of secondary shares) is codcd 0, and other 
types of IPO arc codcd 1 (offer for sale only or both public issue and o k  for sale). 
And tinally, based on studies in the US that show that shans loclcup (or shares 
mota ta im in Malays~a) do affect IPO underpricing (Brav and Gompers, 2MX); 
Mohan and Chen, 2001). the dummy variablc MORAT to indicate the imposition of 
moratorium is included in e q u a h  (3). Share mcnatorium means that the major 
shareholden or pmmolers of the IPO companies arc ~mposed with a resiriction by the 
Securities Commission on selling, Iransfemng assigning or olhenvise dealing w t h  
the secwitia, for a stipulated h - y e a r  period post-IPO. The share moratorium ruler 
that are effective during the sample period protubit the major shareholders of the 
affected company from selling, kansfening or assigning 45 percent of t k u  shares in 
the company for one year from thc date of listing. Thereafler, they are allowed to sell, 
transfer or sign only up to a maximum of one-third per armum of Ihe shares under 
moratorium (on a straight-line basis). 
5. Findings 
S. 1 Sample Characferislics 
Table 2 displays the charactcristics of the lPOs (20 in year 2001 and 42 in year 2OO2), 
panitioned by board of exchange. There are 62 lPOs in the samplc, urmprisiig 26 on 
the Main Board (40 percent) and 36 on the Second Board (60 percent). Companies 
listed on the Main B o d  are on average more than three times and six timcs larger 
than companies listed on the Second Board in t c m  af sales and total arsm 
re.cpectively. The overage ~narket capitalization on the Main and Second Boards are 
RM930 million and RMSO million respectively. Main Board lPOs raised on average 
RM217 million, whmas thc average IPO proaceds accrued to Second Board 
companies is M I 9  million. Two m05 on the Main Board raised more than M I  
billion proceeds. They are Time dotColn Bhd. (RM1.4 billion m 2001) and Maxis 
Communication Bhd. (RM2.8 billion in 2002). On average. 30 percent of the IPO 
proceeds are used for capital expenditure and worldng capital. 
The offer or subscription price ranged fmm RM0.65 b RM4.36 for the full sample, 
with an average of RM1.70. On average, Main Bard  companies fixed their lPOs at 
slightly higher offer price than Second Board ccmpanies (RM1.79 versus RM1.64). 
HOWCVR, ovmubsaiption rates and first day clating prices arc higher for Second 
Board campanies than Main Board companies (ovmubxription: 18 times v m s  6.6 
times; closing price: RM1.95 versus RM1.89). Thc average oversubscription rate for 
the full sampk is 13 times. Although not reportd in Table 2, there an eight lPOs m 
the sample that arc undermbscribed, four each on the Main and Second Boards. IPO 
underpricing ranged from negative 38.5 percent a 180 percent. 
Although not reported in Table 2. mty lPOs (abncn one-third) have fhst day 
closing price lower than the IPO offer price; nine on the Main Board and I I on the 
Second B o d  Average IPO underpricing is sli&ly higher for Second B o d  
companies than Main B o d  companies (23 percent v a  7 penxnt). 
The average growth in  sales are higher for Second Board companies than Main Board 
companies (25 percent versus 14 percent). The average EPS and NTA for the full 
sample arc RM0.25 and RM1.3 I respectively. 
Table 2: IPO Descriptive Statutirr Partitioned by Board of Exchange 
BaaedonlFOOff~ffcrRics 
In terms of board charactcrislics, Ihc full sample have an average of 7.6 board 
members. Thc majority of b o d  mcmben are non-executive directors and 35 percent 
of bard rncmbers arc indcpendcnt directors. Almost No-third of the IPOs arc audited 
by Big 4 ('+tigiouLS.' auditas) compared lo other audit firms. Two-third of tbc 
IPOs are also underwritten by thrcc mcrchant banken, namely Arab MaIaysian 
Merchant Bankers. Asearnbanken and Commerce International Merchant Bankers 
(CIMB). Owcn Lheir domination in Ihe IPO marka, the three are regarded as 
"prestigious" underwriters in this study. Although not leprted in Table 2, five lPOs 
are brought to the ma*et by both non-prestigious auditor and non-prestigious 
underwriter and 24 IPOs engaged both prestigious undenwiter and auditor. Sixteen 
POs arc advised by pnstigious auditor but not prestigious undermiter and 17 IPOs 
are advised by prestigious underwriter but no( prestigious auditor. 
Nearly 40 percent of tbe IPOs comprise publie issues only (i.e. sales of n m  or 
primary sham). There is one IPO h c h  is offer for sale only (i.e. sales of existing or 
secondary shares) and the majority of the lPOs are combination of public issues and 
offer for sales. All IPOs on the Second Board have shate moratorium imposed on the 
major shareholde&promoters. Founeen out of 26 1POs on the Main E%oa~d are subject 
to share moratoriwn 
Table 3 displays tbe IPO descriptive statistics partitioned by accounting method. As 
mentioned beforc, there arc thrce types of accounting methods adopted by IPO firms 
namely liberal, neuml and conservative accounting methods. Liberal accounting 
metbod or income increasing method is when IPO firms recognize negative goodwill 
as h o m e ,  a do not amortize purchase goodwill or use merger method to account for 
business armbination. IF'O firms tbat show reserve on consolidation, or show 
insignificant and immaterial amount of gwdwill or do no( disclose information on the 
choiee of accounting method for buiness combination are classified as neutral. 
Lastly, conservative accounting method or income dcenasing method is associated 
with companies tbat adopt the acquisition mnhod and amortize the resulting goodwill 
over 5, 10, 20 or 25 years. Out of 62 fim in the sample, 21 firms (or 34 pment) use 
the conservative accounting method, 29 h (or 47 percent) usc neutral accounting 
method and 12 h (a 19 percent) ux: the liberal accounting method. 
Tnble3: 1M Derriptive Statistics Partitioned by Accounting Metbod 
Pmcl A : By Ycar 
2001 8 (4PX) 8 (WX) 4 (20%) 20 
2ca2 rn 2,LQmm 
21(34%) 29 (47%) 12 (19%) 62 0623 
Panel B : t i y h r d  
Main 8(31%) 13(5G%) 5(19%) 26 
Ssmnd WXLX ~ l l Z u W  16 
21 (34%) 29 (4%) 12(19%) 62 0.227 
Panel C : By Sector 
Cmmunion O(W.) 3 (100%) O(ffX) 3 
CMamrr h d u n  501%) 7(44?6) 4125?4) 16 
h h l r i a l  RoducI 7(35%) lI(55'A) Z(lIE4) 20 
lnmmucolrc I (50%) 0 (0%) I (50%) 2 
P h w t i o m  0(0%) I (I0D.h) 0 (0%) 1 
Ropmirs 2 (33%) 2 (33Y.) 2 (9%) 6 
TDding Scrviccs fzfu%l ~~ kl 
21 (34%) 29(47%) 12 (19%) 62 9.709 
Pancl D : By Audiror 
Big4 13 (32%) 19(48%) 8 (2%) 40 
Non Big 4 !u,Km 4 a W A  22 
21 (34%) 29(47'/0) 12(I9%) 62 0.099 
Panel E : Bv Msior Undmvnur 
~ k n  ~erchanr Bentcrs I (Y)%) I(J0Sbl O(0V.j 2 
A l luse  Muchsnt B m t m  2 (33%) 2 0 3 % 1  2 (34%) 6 
Arab Msuyrm Mcrch Bank 4 0 3 X I  6 (J0%1 2 117Y.J 12 
Aumbanicm 2(1k/.j ~ 6 i s ~ % j  3(27%j 11 
ClMB* 8 ( U S o  9 (50%) I (6%) 18 
Hrw DBS %N"~s 1(100%) O(O%) O(@h) I 
MaIBysim Inter Macham 1 (25%) 2 (SO.,) I (25%) 4 
R r d w  Machmt Bankers 0 (0%) I (Im) 0(0%) 1 
RHB S a h  Merchant 1 (25%) 2 (50%) 1 (25%) 4 
So1nhcrn I"". Bank I&m Z 1 8 1 Y 3  1 
21 (34%) 29 (4%) 12 (IF/.) 62 N A 
Panel F : By Un&wrior R d g f  
Rcsligiau 14(34%) 21 151%) 6( l lSh)  41 
Non Rcrtigiauj lfwi ~~ a 
21 (34%) 29 (47%) 12 (I!%) 62 I .90n 
Panel G : By IW Type 
Public laauc Only 
Olhm 
Parel H : By Momlorium 
lmposltion 17 (34%) 22 (44%) 11 (22%) 50 
No lmpos*iar L L % W J l % I  12 
21 (34%) 29 (47%) 12 (19%) 62 0.507 
ClMB - Commcree In temat io~ I  Mmhanr Bankcrs Bhd. 
The Chi-Square test slatistics shown in Table 3 indicate that there are m, association 
between accounting mcthad and each of the following mites; year of listing, board 
of cxchange, sectoral clasificatior~, type of auditor, type of underwriter, IPO type and 
IFQ m t o r i u m  Table 3 also shows that more than 80 percent of the IPOs are listed 
unda three business sectors; Consumer Product, lndushial Roduct and Trading and 
Servicrs. 
3.2 IPO Financial Staiistics, Oversubscription and Underpricing 
Table 4 presents the IPO financial statistics and ovmubscription partitioned by 
accounting method. Table 4 indicates that companies with liberal accounting method 
have the highest avenge offer price, net tangiblc as- per s h e ,  camings per share 
and price earnings multiple. The conservatives have the lowest offer price, closing 
price, net langible a& per share, earnings per share and price eamings multiple. 
The liberals also have the lowest ovasubxription and IPO underpricing. Campanics 
that use neutral accounting method have the highest averagc oversubscription rate of 
18 times compared to nine times for other axounting methods. Neutral companies 
also have the highest average first day closing price and underpricing. Based on 
Fisher test statistics on differences in means between the three subsamples, the only 
variahle that diffcrs significantly between the three accounting methods is nct tangible 
assets per share. Net tangible assm is highest for libaals (RM1.49). followed by 
neutrals (RM 1.34) and conservatives (RM 1.18). 
The following are the salient facts on IPO underpricing as shown in Table 5. 
Underpricing is slightly higher in 2W1 (18 percent) compared to 2002 (15 percent). 
IPO underpricing on the S e m d  Board is significantly higher than Main Board at the 
10 percent significant level. IPOs underwritten by pnstigious underwriter also have 
significantly higher underpricing at the ten percent significant level. This result is 
consistent with Bealty and Wclch (1996) and Smart and Zutter (2003). Beany and 
Welch (1996) T d  on the selection and compensation of "cxperc" -the legal 
counsel, the a d t o r  and the invcrrmenl banker by an issuer of IPO. 'Chcy found a 
positive relalim between IPO underpricing and undenvriter compensation (proxy for 
prestige) and the positive relation is only among firms wilb Tew risk factors. Smarl 
and Zutter (2003) study Ule effecls of dual-dass ownaship swctures on IPO 
underpricing and found that one of the wnbol variables that is lPOs underwitten by 
high qualiry underwriter aperience greater underpricing 




** S i g n i f a t  at 0.01 level 
P m l A  By Year (V.) (x) (K) fi.) (%-T 
1001 20 8 .  -38.5 IEOD 59.8 
2002 42 5 4  -21.1 104.6 24.6 0.22 
P m l B  By Bond 
Main B a d  26 7.1 -28.9 104.6 25.5 
S e m d  Board 36 23.1 48.5 180.0 45.6 1.761 
h l C  By AudiuW 
Big 4 40 11.4 -38.5 180.0 40.8 
Non Big 4 22 25.5 -26.4 104.6 34.6 I .A4 
Pawl D By Undmnitcr 
Rrs;ge 
hsti8ious 41 21.7 -33.3 180.0 43.3 
Non R c n i 8 i w  21 6.1 -38.5 100.0 26.8 -l.74# 
Panel F By lPOTypc 
Public luue Only 26 30.7 -38.5 180.0 52.2 
0 t h  36 6.1 -33.3 733 21.1 2.28. 
P m J H  BySoctor 
Consmxtion 3 5 9  8.0 104.6 
Conasrrr 16 20.9 -3.9 129.1 
InQmi.1 PmQcr 20 20.5 -38.5 180.0 
lnfnsmvbl~c 2 -15.4 -26.4 -4.4 
PI.nDtionr I 18.5 18.5 I83 
-5 6 -8.1 -289 8 3  
Trading Ssrviau 14 12.6 -22.8 100.0 
** Signfiuntat0.01 level 
Significant at 0.05 level 
P Significant a1 0.10 level 
Table 5 also indicates that IPOs canprising e n c b ~ e l y  of sales of new shares with 
ZRO participation fmm the IPO entrepreneus (plblic i w e )  have significantly higher 
underpricing at the five percent level than LPOs that involved sales of existing shares 
by the IPO mtrepmeurs, consistent with Habib and Ljungqvist (2001). 
5.3 Regression RenrlLI 
Table 6 shows the Pearson correlation matrix between the continuous variables used 
in the s d y .  None of the mdependent variables have correlation caefiicient more than 
0.4. lo brief, Table 6 shows that there is a positive association between: income 
increasing mahod and NTA. forecast EPS and NTA, and forecast EPS and sales 
growth. Offa price is positively correlated with EPS, NTA. sales growlh and firm 
size. First day closing price is positively correlated with EPS and sales growth. IPO 
underpricing s negatively correlated with firm size and positively correlated with 
ovasubsniption rate. 
Tables 7.8 and 9 show the Rsults for the multivariate analysis. Both the IPO pricing 
model (Table 7) and IPO first day valuation model (Table 8) have reasonably good fit, 
although the former has better explanatory power. The IPO underpricing model 
(Table 9) cau only explain 10 percent of the variation and the F-slalisuc is mildly 
significant at 10 percent. In all the models, the variance inflation factor for the 
explanators do not exceed 2, suggesting hat multicollinearity is not a problem. 
Consistent with the hypotheses, the variablc of interest namely ACCMTD is 
positively awciated with OFFER and negatively awnciated with CLOSE and 
UNDERPRIC. However, none of the coefficienls are statistically significant. 
Consistent with the lmivariate results presenled earlier, the main determinants of 
OFFER are the three fmancial variables EPS, NTA and FIRM SIZE. However, unlike 
the univariale results, GROWTH a d  AUD an not significant in the multiple 
regression. As for the determinant of first day closing pria, the only significant 
variable is EPS; higher EPS leads to higherfint day valuation. And fmally IPO initial 
return is determined by the level of ovembxription and owner's participation ratio. 
wnsident with Habib and Ljuagqvist (2001). G r e w  oversubscription and lower 
participation ratio generate doeperundeqmicing. 
6. Conclusion 
This study extends Neill el al. (1995) by investigating whether accounting method 
influences IPO vabtion. However, d i k e  Ncill el aL (1995). the accounting methods 
chosen are pooling versus purchase choice for buiiess combinations. Consistent with 
the prc&ictions, the results do indicate that IPO companies with libnal mahod have 
higher [PO offer price, consistent with managers' income maximizing motivc. 
Howcver. IPO investors are not fixated by such inam "manipulation" that does not 
&cct cash flow, and penalired liberal canpanits when the shares commenced trading 
with lower fint day closing price. Consequemly, IPO initial return or lmderpricing is 
lower for companies sdopting the liberal method. Although lhe relationship between 
aoeaunting method and IPO valuation are in the anticipated direction, none of the 
coefficients arc statistically significant. Perhaps a larger sample size or a more refined 
liberaVneutraYwnscrvative classifications can make a hffmce. 
Table 6:  Peanon Correlation Matrix 
I 1 I I I I I 
** Significant a1 0.0 1 lavcl 
Significant at 0.05 level 
Table 7: RegressLon Results on the Determinants or Olfer Price 
" Significant a1 0.01 level 
Significant at 0.05 level 
















" Significant a1 0.01 level 
Significant a10.05 level 





































































T ~ b k  9: Regression Restitti of the Determinants of IPO Underpriclug 
. - - - . . - - - 
T k 0 j 9  0.60 NONEXEC 
USEPROC 4.13 -0.76 
- 
OVERSUB 0.01 2.03. I .05 
IPOTYPE 4.23 -2.39. 1 .04 
MORAT 0.10 0.78 1.10 
MTERAD 0.07 0.67 
Adjusted R' = 0. lOIl 
" Significant at 0.01 level 
Significant at 0.05 level 
U Significant at 0.10 level 
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Appendix 1 




Fomaskd earning per share. 
NTA Net tangible a%ut pcr share post-IPO 
ACCMTD 
Average growth in sales based on most recent three 
Ye== 
Accounting mcihod; 0-conservative, I-neutral and 
2-liberal 
NONEXEC Pementage ornonexeculive directors 
USEPROC The proportion of 1PO proceeds utilized for 
working capital and capital expenditure 







The type of IPO; 0-public issue only, I d h e r s  
Auditor prestige; 0-non Big 4, I-Big 4 ( E m t  
Young, KPMG, Pncewaterhodoopers or 
DcloiltcKwimChan) 
Underwiter prestige 0-others, I-major u n d e m i t a  
is eilher Arab Malaysian, Asearnbankers or ClMB 
AUD X W R I T E R  
Share moratorium imposed by the Secur~ties 
Commission; 0-not imposed I-imposed 
Logarithm of total asset of a firm 
OFFER IPO offer or subscription price 
CLOSE* First day closing market price 
UNDERPRlC (Closing price - Offer price) 1 Offer pnce 
* Data are oblained fmm investors Digest. The remaining data arc obta~ned from IPO 
ProSpeCNs 
